



საქართველოს სტრატეგიისა და საერთაშორისო ურთიერთობათა კვლევის ფონდი  
GEORGIAN FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

27

**POLICING GEORGIA: PERENNIAL NEED FOR  
SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

*REVAZ BAKHTADZE*

**EXPERT OPINION**



**2014**



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## Introduction

Police represent one of the key state institutions and have a fundamental impact on people's lives. They provide public safety and serve as a conduit to the criminal justice system (OECD 2007, 163). International organizations produce an increasing number of guides on democratic policing, security sector governance and foreign aid which testify to the growing importance that police forces play in development and democratic transition (CoE 2001, CoE 2005, OECD 2007, OSCE 2008). Simultaneously, think tanks and scholars have focused on policing, including in Central and Eastern Europe, and published several studies on individual states (Caparini and Marenin 2004). In this regard, Georgia represents an important case as a country with law enforcement burdened by the Soviet legacy that has been transformed into a functional police force.

The Georgian police reform in 2004-2012 has attracted considerable attention among international policy and scholarly circles because the Georgian police was one of the most corrupted and criminalized institutions in the country. Matthew Devlin (2010, 2) described it as "the most hardened, xenophobic and byzantine of Georgia's institutions, its dysfunction deeply rooted in the country's tumultuous history." The widespread corruption, the blurred line between the political and criminal worlds and the failure of state institutions marked the country before the Rose Revolution in 2003. Providing public safety and establishing legitimacy were herculean undertakings (Kupatadze 2012, 4). Thus, the police reform in the post-Soviet Republic of Georgia has been one of the remarkable achievements of Mikheil Saakashvili's revolutionary government. The World Bank, OSCE and other international organizations have praised Georgia as an example of how corrupted and inefficient police structures can be transformed into a clean and functional police force. However, the criticism regarding power abuse and human rights violations has also been voiced. After the democratic transfer of power in October 2012, the new authorities promised to depoliticize the police and transform it into a "neutral" law enforcement agency.

Below, I will present an extensive review of policing reforms in Georgia. Then, I will provide a short background on performance management in policing and discuss the CompStat model which represents the marriage of traditional, hierarchical policing with an outcome-focused management technique. To analyze the impact of performance management on policing, the paper will provide a brief history of CompStat introduction in New York City (the birthplace of the model) and describe the main elements of CompStat and the related process. The paper will argue that CompStat is

a realistic policy option to provide public safety, responsiveness and accountability in Georgia.

## **Police in Post-Soviet Georgia**

The police structure in Georgia remained largely intact after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991, when Georgia gained independence, the population amounted to 5,400,800. By that time, 25,000 people served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 900 for the KGB (the infamous Soviet security service) with a ratio of 1:208 between law enforcement officers and citizens. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had 28 departments, two branches in autonomous republics and nine regional offices. In the following years, new departments were created and the number of police officers increased up to 56,000 while the population decreased by almost one million people. By the end of 2003, the police-citizen ratio stood at 1:78 (Kupatadze et al. 2007, 93-94).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled a large share of the petrol, tobacco, food and manufactured goods markets, businesses that are related to smuggling. For example, the government collected taxes for only 27.3 percent of the consumed petrol in the first half of 2001 (Darchiashvili 2003, 8). Very low salaries were seen as the main reason behind the widespread bribery, extortion and racketeering among policemen. Since the police offered a wide range of possibilities for private revenue generation, the number of policemen rose considerably over the years. The size of personnel serving in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was an issue of speculation before 2004 and ranged between 40,000 and 60,000. Usually, bribing a responsible official was enough to get employment in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Fritz 2004, 138). People paid between USD 2,000 and USD 20,000 to become policemen. A regular involvement in illegal activities compensated the initial payments (World Bank 2012, 13).

After the Rose Revolution, one of the top priorities of Saakashvili's government was to transform the debased law enforcement sector. Three main objectives – eradicating corruption, fighting against organized crime and providing public services – guided his reform initiatives which will be described in the following sections.

## **Overview of Major Reforms in 2004-2012**

### *Structural Reforms*

To achieve a profound impact, fundamental administrative reforms were implemented and the architecture of the security sector was changed. The

administrative reform included the transfer of military units to the Ministry of Defense and the incorporation of other policing entities from various agencies. The Ministry of Defense took responsibility for the internal troops and the Ministry of Justice incorporated the National Bureau of Citizens Registration and the Preliminary Detention Isolators. In February 2004, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) absorbed the State Border Guard and the State Material Reserve Department and, in December 2004, the Ministry of State Security merged with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kupatadze et al. 2007, 93-94). The latter was a crucial step to eliminate the duplication of functions because the Ministry of State Security maintained parallel law enforcement structures with the MIA. Moreover, these two agencies were infamous for their mutual animosity which further complicated the lives of ordinary citizens (Devlin 2010, 2-3).

The MIA abolished the Main Administrative Board of the Traffic Police, Protection of Public Order, Ecology Police and the Transport Department. The Financial Police was created in the Ministry of Finance while the Ministry of Internal Affairs maintained responsibility for only money laundering and money forgery (Boda and Kakachia 2005, 3). In January 2005, the Department of Intelligence, which right after the Rose Revolution became part of the Ministry of State Security, was again separated and transformed into the stand-alone Georgian Intelligence Service (Fluri and Lortkipanidze 2006, 2; Georgian Intelligence Service 2014).

### *Personnel Reduction*

The major challenge to reforming the Ministry of Internal Affairs was a personnel change. The recruitment system had mainly depended on nepotism before the reform process. After massive dismissals, different branches experienced an acute shortage of qualified staff, especially investigative units. Although the recruitment system became more transparent, political lobbyism and nepotism still remained problematic issues. New recruits often performed poorly while more experienced officers were fired without clearly established criteria. There were three main stages of personnel reduction and each coincided with the replacement of ministers. There was no comprehensive staffing policy in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kupatadze et al. 2007, 98).

The exact number of the fired personnel from the Ministry of Internal Affairs is hard to find in the scholarly literature or in the public documents. This issue has been controversial because some policemen claimed they were dismissed without concrete reasons. The most frequently mentioned number is about 16,000 officers, mainly from the former traffic police

(World Bank 2012; Light 2013). Fluri and Lortkipanidze (2006, 4) reported that 32 percent of personnel was planned to be dismissed from the whole Ministry in 2005. However, the source of information is not identified in the text and the number is not corroborated in other publicly available documents. The long-time Minister of Interior, Ivane (Vano) Merabishvili, told the Russian edition of *Forbes Magazine* in May 2012 that the total number of dismissed personnel was around 80,000 and only 5 percent of old employees maintained their jobs (Forbes.Ru 2012). However, it is more likely that the Minister implied the total number of personnel fired from the whole security and defense sectors, including the Ministries of Justice and Defense. Currently, 27,000 people work for the Ministry, including 4,000 border guards and the police-citizen ratio constitutes 1:89 (Marat 2013, 13).

### *Police Academy*

Before the reforms, the Police Academy was infamous for its corrupt practices. Kupatadze et al. (2007) report that prospective students had to pay USD 4,000 - USD 6,000 to get admitted as well as smaller amounts afterward to pass various examinations. It was believed that the Police Academy personnel received nearly half a million USD in bribes annually. In 2004 and 2005, new leadership introduced transparent and demanding examinations for cadets. If, before the reforms, 98 percent of cadets graduated, only 78 out of 307 cadets passed the state examinations in 2005. The number of personnel was reduced from 650 to 150 and the salaries quadrupled. The initial two-week training courses for patrol officers were extended to six weeks in 2005. The Police Academy received extensive foreign assistance to develop study manuals and training programs. The OSCE shared experience from the Kosovo Police Academy. The Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute of the Open Society Institute, the US Embassy in Georgia, the European Union Rule of Law Programme, the British Council and local NGOs participated in the transformation of the Police Academy in Georgia (*ibid.*, 100-101).

### *Patrol Police*

The Traffic Police was one of the most despicable institutions in Georgia. Traffic policemen routinely stopped motorists and asked for small fines. It did not matter whether or not citizens violated laws. The extracted revenue was shared with superiors. A 2000 study estimated that seven out of ten motorists stopped by police had to pay bribes (World Bank 2012, 13-14). The new government considered the traffic police to be the most visible symbol of corruption and hence, one of the top priorities to reform

(*ibid.*, 15). In July 2004, the old traffic police was abolished and the new patrol police was established in August 2004. For about a month, Georgia lived without a single uniformed policeman regulating traffic movements on streets (Kupatadze et al. 2007, 101). The government provided two months' pay and amnesty for past crimes to the dismissed officers (World Bank 2012, 15).

Initially, 2,467 officers began to serve in the new patrol police. Later, that number rose to 3,755 by the fall of 2005. USD 4.7 million was spent on new uniforms, Western-made police cars and other technical means which helped the new branch not only to perform duties effectively but also create a professional and positive image in society. The average wage for patrol policemen amounted to 350 Georgian *lari* (~USD 200) as compared to the previous 140 Georgian *lari* (~USD 75) (Kupatadze et al. 2007, 101).

In addition to providing decent salaries and working conditions, new monitoring mechanisms were introduced, too. Ordinary policemen were assigned undercover officers as partners. The former learnt about the arrangement only if s/he violated rules. Frequent spot checks were carried out to make sure officers observed protocols. A driver would deliberately make a minor violation of traffic rules. When stopped, he would apologize and offer 20 Georgian *lari* (~USD 12) as a bribe to let him go. If tempted, the officers were caught and fired immediately. Now, police only issue tickets and citizens pay fines in banks. Previously, drivers had to directly pay to policemen. In other instances, undercover officers reported on domestic violence to see if the policemen followed the case. A 24/7 hotline was established for citizens to report anonymously on police abuse and violation of rights. The authorities intended to send a strong message that the leadership would not tolerate the violation of laws and procedures (World Bank 2012, 16).

A nation-wide public relations campaign accompanied the reform process in the police. Even police stations were re-designed and new glass buildings were built to project the image of transparency. TV ads showed policemen in a positive light. The World Bank report quotes then Speaker of Parliament, Davit Bakradze, who said that the goal of the campaign was to create new role models in society. Before the Rose Revolution, a survey of schoolchildren demonstrated that many wanted to become thieves-in-law (World Bank 2012, 18).

### *"Zero Tolerance" and Mass Incarceration*

The message of President Saakshvili and his team was unequivocal even before coming to power: corruption and lawlessness had to end. In his 14

February 2006 State of the Nation address, Saakashvili severely criticized judges and accused them of releasing thieves from custody. “I am initiating a new draft law: zero tolerance toward even petty crime. I am initiating amendments to the criminal code which envisage banning conditional sentences for house burglary, street robbery, possession of drugs and other petty offenses. ‘No’ to conditional sentence; everyone who commits these [crimes] should go to jail,” stated the President (Civil Georgia, 2006). Saakashvili formally declared the war on thieves-in-law in the same address and promised that their existence would not be tolerated anymore.

James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling developed the concept of “broken windows” that led to the formulation of the zero tolerance policy. They argued that minor and major crimes were interrelated and solving the former problem could have dramatic effect on reducing the latter (Kelling and Willson 1982). The zero tolerance policy and near-universal incarceration brought about a drastic increase of the prison population. The number of prisoners quadrupled and from the 6,119 in 2003, the number rose to 24,114 in 2011. With 547 prisoners per every 100,000 citizens, Georgia was surpassed by only the US, Rwanda and Russia (Kupatadze 2012, 14).

Mass incarceration proved extremely unpopular in Georgia. In 2009, 82 percent of the surveyed people indicated that they supported the reduction of the inmate population. The high number of prisoners was one of the reasons behind the mass protests since November 2007. In 2009, protestors erected mock cells and blocked Tbilisi streets for several months. The government linked these protests to thieves-in-law who organized and sponsored the rallies against the authorities (Slade 2012, 51).

### *War on Organized Crime*

In light of debilitating state institutions, organized crime groups, known as thieves-in-law, became the main actors in extracting resources and providing protection and dispute resolution in the 1990s and early 2000s. The title of thief-in-law is granted through special rituals and it represents the highest status in the criminal world. This phenomenon emerged in the 1930s in the Soviet Union and still exists throughout the region. Georgia was the leading producer of thieves-in-law. In post-Soviet Georgia, thieves-in-law penetrated the parliament and the government to protect their business and criminal interests. They regularly paid bribes to local police chiefs and high officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs to get their support in conflicts or ensure police “neutrality” (Slade 2012, 38-39).

Saakashvili’s government introduced new anti-mafia legislation to fight thieves-in-law. Slade (2012, 43) reports that Georgia copied the legislation

mainly from the United States and Italy. The US' 1970 Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Emergency Decree Law 306/8 of June 1992 developed by the Italian Anti-Mafia Commission had particular influence on the Georgian anti-mafia policies. Some experience from Estonia and Kosovo were borrowed, too (Marat 2013, 14). The new laws allowed the Georgian authorities to seize the property and the assets of criminals and prosecute people for just admitting their status in the criminal world. According to the code of honor of thieves-in-law, the denial of one's own status was a shame and could result in expulsion from the fraternity. Criminals were unprepared for such changes although they later amended their own rules to be able to refuse to answer whether or not they are members of organized crime groups (Slade 2012, 44-45; World Bank 2012, 15).

By the end of 2006, the prosecutor-general declared that there was "not one thief-in-law left in freedom" (Slade 2012, 45). They were either imprisoned or left for other countries. The Georgian organized crime groups failed to successfully respond to the swift changes. However, critics pointed out that the state need for extra money was actually behind the anti-mafia policies and the police often abused power when confiscating property (*ibid.*,45).

For the government the heavy-handed approach was the means to establish order and demonstrate the authority of public institutions over informal ones. It aimed at changing people's perceptions by undermining their respect toward the criminal underworld. "One hundred and eighty members of the thieves' world were prosecuted and convicted" and assets worth more than one billion USD were seized between 2006 and 2010. Several confiscated houses became police stations (World Bank 2012, 15).

### *Crime Rate and Victimization*

The crime rate fell sharply as a result of new policies. As compared to 2006, all registered crimes decreased by 54 percent in 2010 while the serious crime dropped by 66 percent in the same period (Slade 2012, 49). Some crimes, such as car theft, almost vanished. Another powerful indicator of policing effectiveness is the level of victimization which reveals the fear of crime in society. The EU sponsored victimization research showed that it also diminished from 29.7 percent in 2006 to 16.8 percent in 2011 (Kupatadze 2012, 9-10). The International Republican Institute reported that 87 percent of Georgians surveyed in 2011 assessed the police work as favorable placing it in third place after the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Army (IRI 2011).

### *Transforming Police into a Service Provider*

After the main phases of fighting against corruption and organized crime ended in 2006, the Ministry of Internal Affairs made providing services to citizens its priority. The Service Agency under the Ministry began working in February 2007 and it fundamentally changed its mode of service delivery (Ministry of Internal Affairs a 2014). Before the reforms, procedures for car registration and obtaining drivers' licenses were time-consuming and very complicated to facilitate corruption. One could purchase the driver's license for about USD 100 (World Bank 2012, 18). The Service Agency has introduced a "one-stop-shop" principle housing all necessary offices in one building, such as police, notary and customs. Cars can be registered in seven minutes and all procedures for getting a driver's license take a maximum of two hours. Efficient procedures for car registration have created a large regional used car market. Used cars imported from the US, Europe and Asia are frequently re-exported to neighboring countries. The re-export of cars was a leading export commodity of Georgia in 2011. In 2011, a 911-type service was established uniting hotlines of not only police, emergency, fire and rescue but also utilities, such as water and gas. The utility companies are mostly private firms (Ministry of Internal Affairs b 2014; World Bank 2012, 19; Kupatadze 2012, 7). In 2008, new legislation allowed the MIA to become a leading private security provider and regulator, too. It has provided additional revenue to the Ministry as well as helped soften the impact of mass dismissals from the police. Former policemen constitute 40 percent of the Security Police staff (Lehmbruch and Sanikidze 2014, 100-101).

### *International Assistance*

The US and the OSCE were the two primary providers of international expertise on policing reform. The American side provided substantial technical and financial aid promptly while multi-lateral assistance through the OSCE took more time. The US Embassy was instrumental in establishing the Patrol Police Command Center and the centralized 24/7 dispatching system (Devlin 2010, 6). Initially, the OSCE established the Short Term Assistance Program (STAP) which was replaced by a more detail-oriented Police Reform Program. The latter had two primary objectives: to introduce community policing and improve human resource management (Puppo 2010, 2; Kubny 2009, 71-75; Hiscock 2009, 124). However, scholars agree that the donor impact on the reform process in the Georgian police was limited. Georgia exhibited a high level of local ownership when it came to security sector reforms. This was an unusual pattern as local elites often fear that reforms would weaken their position (Hiscock 2009, 130; Puppo 2010, 4).

## **Criticism of Police Reforms**

Some scholars maintain that the overall reform process in Georgia was chaotic, poorly coordinated and driven by selected individuals, not based on the shared and systematic strategy (Hiscock 2009; MacGinty 2013). According to Marat (2013, 8), the lack of public debate and public participation constituted the main shortcoming of the police reform in Georgia. Such an approach always entails the risk of police becoming the servant of authoritarian leaders regardless of the professional and human rights training policemen receive (Puppo 2010, 3).

The Georgian police reform was not informed by the “democratic policing” model and the successful eradication of corruption and the largely effective provision of policing services occurred amidst the governmental control over the judiciary and civil service. The Georgian case illustrated that the relationship between democratization and police reform is not straightforward (Light, 18). Poor coordination, a lack of transparency and neglect of the democratic policing model are three recurring themes identified by the scholars who analyzed the police reform under the Saakashvili government. These shortcomings were frequently mentioned during the 2012 pre-election campaign, too, by the then main opposition coalition, the Georgian Dream. The Georgian Dream promised to depoliticize the police and even split the Ministry into several independent agencies. The following section summarizes the reforms that have actually been implemented by the new government in the last two years.

## **Reforms in 2013-2014**

The new government under the leadership of Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili made the restructuring of the Ministry of Internal Affairs its top priority. The Constitutional Protection Department was abolished in 2013 because of its alleged meddling into politics and widespread violation of human rights. Two new departments were established instead: Anti-Corruption Agency and State Security Agency. The former is responsible for fighting corruption in the public sector while the latter identifies and mitigates threats against constitutional order such as extremism and political violence. The Special Operations Department (SOD) was another major entity that was abolished and merged with the Criminal Police Department. Now, the tasks of the newly created Central Criminal Police Department involve fighting organized crime, drug and human trafficking (functions of the defunct SOD) as well as investigating ordinary crimes which was the main responsibility of the Criminal Police Department (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2013).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs works on the implementation of two major reforms in 2014. First, the management of fire-fighting units throughout Georgia will be united and merged with the new Legal Entity under Public Law Emergency Situations Agency under the MIA. In 2004, the fire-fighting responsibility was transferred to the local governments. According to the Strategy Paper of the MIA, the arrangement has proved ineffective. The Emergency Situations Agency will provide overall management and coordination to prevent, mitigate or eradicate all emergencies. Thus, the Ministry hopes to raise the efficiency and the effectiveness of the whole emergency management system (Ministry of Internal Affairs c 2014, 27-28). Second, the Police Academy will introduce an MA program for mid-level policemen and change the current system which relies on short-term training and courses for both new recruits and mid-level police managers (Ministry of Internal Affairs c 2014, 98-99). While it takes time to show the effectiveness of the above-mentioned reforms, several Georgian and foreign experts have already criticized the institutional changes of 2013 in private conversations with the author and called them “mere changes of the titles.” The recent public opinion poll also suggests that the perceptions of the crime level have deteriorated since the Georgian Dream came to power in October 2012 (NDI 2014).

### **Performance Management in Policing: CompStat Model**

Performance management in policing is a prevalent trend both in developed and developing countries. As a part of the New Public Management (NPM), various measures of performance and result-oriented approaches to administration have permeated into the conservative realm of law enforcement and shaped its outlook (Maillard and Savage 2012, 363). Inspired by the private sector management thinking, the New Public Management has advocated the introduction of market mechanisms in public service delivery, the privatization of public utilities, organizational restructuring and decentralization with increased control through performance-based funding and accountability systems since the 1970s. However, it was not until the 1990s that police agencies began experimenting with performance management systems in the United States and Great Britain (Butterfield, Edwards, and Woodall 2004, 396; Bruijn 2002, 578). Below, I will describe the main elements of CompStat as a crime control model which has been adopted successfully in New York City and emulated across the globe. With some adaptation to local needs, it can be introduced in Georgia, too, to make policing effective and accountable.

New York Police Department Commissioner, William Bratton, introduced CompStat in 1994 as a new management system to reduce crime and im-

prove the quality of life in the neighborhoods of New York City. CompStat stands for Computerized Statistics (Bratton and Malinowski 2008, 261). Bratton's aim was to make this huge organization responsive to his leadership, a police agency infamous for its resistance to change (Weisburd et al. 2003, 425). When he took office, the NYPD was a sluggish, disoriented institution where almost all managers were focused on controlling corruption, response time to 911 calls and post-incident investigations. The NYPD lost its sense of crime control mission and the prevailing theories maintained that the causes of crime were economic, social and demographic factors and the police could do very little to address them. Contrary to mainstream thinking, CompStat has proved that innovative policing does increase public safety: from 1993 to 1998, the burglary rate dropped by 53 percent, reported robberies decreased by 54 percent and homicide by 67 percent in New York City (Bratton and Malinowski 2008, 260-261).

Commissioner Bratton and his staff based their reform on five principles:

1. *specific objectives*. It is crucial that a chief of police, in coordination with other top-level commanders, identifies three to five specific objectives for a year or any other reasonable period. The objectives should be crime-related only, such as decreasing street robberies, curbing youth violence, reducing youth homicide, getting guns off the streets, etc. This is a powerful message for all police units indicating what is worthy of focus. Police chiefs must avoid including administrative objectives in the list as well as formulating objectives in percentages or numbers such as, for instance, reducing car-jacking by 15 percent. Staff might work hard to achieve the concrete number and disregard other instances of violations;
2. *timely and accurate intelligence*. Timely and rapid analysis of crime data drives the CompStat model of policing. Analysts regularly map incidents with the help of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software which pinpoints two types of situations: (a) troublesome hot spots and (b) crime patterns. Crime data for mapping come from various sources: information reported by the public, police officers' intelligence reports, informants, prisoner debriefings, CCTV cameras, Internet and other public agencies;
3. *effective strategies and tactics*. CompStat requires that timely data are available to officers at all levels in a user-friendly format. Strategies, planning and decision-making must be data-driven. In contrast to the traditional model in which different units and police leaders work independently from one another, in CompStat, the patrol police holds the responsibility for crime in a specific geographic area while inves-

tigative and other units support the patrol policemen. Support unit commanders actively participate in the analysis and planning process and are held accountable together with patrol police leaders. Regular reporting meetings require precinct or district commanders to present and discuss crime situations before their peers and the designated police leader. These meetings have only two items on the agenda: crime and public safety. Other issues should be discussed at other meetings. CompStat involves changing established procedures and routines in response to operational needs. Precinct commanders are the ones who determine those needs. Mid-level managers are expected to conduct empirical evaluations to learn what works and what does not. Police leadership encourages them to experiment, gain knowledge from other departments and familiarize themselves with the latest research in criminology;

4. *rapid deployment of personnel and resources.* Mid-level managers not only make decisions but also receive sufficient resources to be successful in their work. The leader of the CompStat meeting (chief or deputy chief of police) must be a highly-skilled operator who understands data and can ask probing questions to area commanders and other participants. This helps attendants analyze problems in-depth and identify necessary solutions and resources needed for dealing with hot spots or crime prevention;
5. *follow-up and assessment.* The final and probably the decisive element of CompStat is follow-up and assessment. In the CompStat process, detailed notes are taken about every decision and change of strategy and tactics. As a rule, precinct commanders make reports on the following CompStat meeting about how they applied new tactics and resources, what worked and why. Methods of evaluation should include both qualitative and quantitative components. Variables such as crime patterns, persistence of crime hot spots, citizen complaints and arrests resulting in prosecution should be used in the vigorous evaluative process. Accountability and promotion must be based on the results of assessment (Weisburd et al. 2003, 427-429; McDonald 2002, 8-22).

Crime statistics in New York City are focused on the reported rates of seven major index crimes. Murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny and grand larceny auto are listed in order of their seriousness (Kelley and McCarthy 2013, 4-7). The reviews of performance, weekly statistics and comparisons of precinct results are public (Moore and Braga 2003, 446-447). The leadership of the MIA may choose different crime types and/or crime indices to include in the Georgian version of CompStat.

The NYPD implements several mechanisms to ensure that data are accurately reported, especially the classification of crimes. Crime classification has impact on both the overall policing strategy and the accountability of mid-level managers. Within each precinct, the Crime Analysis Team reviews a complaint report entered the previous day and checks the accuracy of the classification. The team may contact the reporting officer or the desk clerk to specify details. Sometimes they also call the complainant to ensure that all facts are recorded properly. Commanding officers also review complaints and make necessary changes. The software limits access to complaint reports and the levels of access are strictly defined. In addition, there are the Quality Assurance Division and the Data Integrity Unit, two specially designated entities inside the NYPD that review and monitor the accuracy of data reporting (Kelley and McCarthy 2013, 9-11, 23).

These data constitute the main basis for the CompStat meetings of the NYPD leadership and mid-level commanders. The crime rates in one precinct are reviewed in relation to adjacent precincts so that area commanders do not reduce crime statistics by driving criminals into neighboring areas. Along with statistics, top managers are focused on the process as well. This softens pressure on precinct commanders. They can get credit for a thoughtful analysis of a worsening criminal situation in their districts and proposed new tactics. Overall, individual managers are accountable for specific results in the assigned geographic area and those results play a crucial role in their career path (Moore and Braga 2003, 447).

CompStat is a rational, outcome-oriented performance management system that can satisfy requirements for responsiveness, accountability and effectiveness as has repeatedly demonstrated across the globe. However, the fathers of CompStat, Bratton and Malinowski (2008, 262-263), caution that the experience has revealed important lessons, too: performance management requires strong leadership, coaching of mid-level managers and recognition that performance management is an instrument to manage and lead, not an end in itself.

## **Conclusion**

The police in Georgia has gone through a tumultuous path of development. The post-Soviet legacy of inefficiency and human rights abuse haunts the Georgian law enforcement system even today. However, the radical reforms under President Mikheil Saakashvili transformed the Georgian police into a leaner and cleaner organization which achieved spectacular results in eradicating corruption and defeating the infamous organized crime groups known as thieves-in-law. The successor of Saakashvili

and his United National Movement, the Georgian Dream coalition, vowed to depoliticize the Ministry of Internal Affairs and make it a “neutral” and effective police force. Despite a few important institutional changes and attempts to introduce better-coordinated reforms, allegations and reports of abuse and inefficiency persist (Civil Georgia 2014). Because law enforcement plays the crucial role in providing public safety and political stability in Georgia, it is important to reform the police force in a way that ensures safety, responsiveness and accountability. The implementation of the CompStat model in New York City offers a good example of how the law enforcement system can be developed in Georgia. Adopting CompStat in Georgia would consolidate reforms in policing and provide a solid basis to measure performance, motivate personnel and better serve the Georgian people.

With the introduction of CompStat in the New York City Police Department, the golden era of performance management in policing has begun across the globe. CompStat has enabled decision-makers to synthesize two different modes of policing: a professional model that entails military style command and centralized control, on the one hand, and community policing with an emphasis on decentralization, rank-and-file involvement and service provision, on the other. The CompStat process has empowered mid-level managers, increased their accountability to police leadership and provided regularly collected data for decision-making.

While certainly not exhaustive, the policing model above offers means to overcome certain inefficiencies in the Georgian police force and better account for resources used in reducing crime rates. Proper implementation of performance management in policing would allow the Georgian public to achieve greater accountability and safety.

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