Intern's contribution

Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are united by a common goal of European integration. To expedite their progress, the three states created a formalised cooperation format known as the Associated Trio. However, recent developments have revealed a notable shift in their respective European integration paths. While Georgia continues its democratic backsliding and escalation of the anti-Western rhetoric, Ukraine and Moldova are moving closer to the European Union (EU) in tandem, garnering substantial rhetorical and practical backing from EU Member States. In this respect, the European Political Community (EPC) summit held on 1 June 2023 in Moldova was very representative of the divide within the Associated Trio. This situation raises pertinent questions about the current state of the Associated Trio and its potential future trajectory: What are the dynamics at play within the A3, and what does the future hold for this format?

European integration and the EU candidate status issue

The founding of the Associated Trio on 17 May 2021 marked a significant milestone in the development of relations between Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova[1]. The trilateral cooperation on European integration, which had long been advocated for by civil society in these countries, finally came to fruition. The founding memorandum, however, fell short of establishing comprehensive regional cooperation, merely initiating dialogue between the parties on matters of common interest related to European integration[2]. Another pivotal event for the Associated Trio was the presidential summit of the Associated Trio, held in Batumi on 20 July 2021, reaffirming the commitment to a joint European integration path and willingness to enhance cooperation. Thus, the initiative was promising, with the potential to evolve into an enhanced economic and political regional cooperation format. Throughout 2021, the Associated Trio remained active, holding monthly ad hoc meetings, and engaging in joint visits to Brussels.

The divergence in the European integration progress between Ukraine and Moldova on one hand, and Georgia on the other, has emerged against the backdrop of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The contrasting reactions to the Russian aggression have significantly impacted the dynamics of engagement between the Associated Trio participants. On 28 February 2022, a few days into the full-scale war, Ukraine formally applied for EU membership. Shortly thereafter, Georgia and Moldova also submitted their applications, albeit without coordination. In June 2022, the EU granted official candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. However, Georgia, despite having its European perspective legally confirmed, fell short of attaining this status. Additionally, the European Commission imposed twelve conditions for obtaining candidate status, which Georgia has yet to fulfil[3].

While not officially stated, Georgia’s democratic backsliding played a significant role in the EU’s decision not to grant candidate status to the country. As a result, the Associated Trio was effectively split into different European integration tracks, at least for the time being. On top of that, the EU’s decision was preceded by a remark from Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili, asserting that Georgia deserved to receive the EU candidate status more than Ukraine and Moldova, since, according to him, Georgia was the most advanced in European integration progress among the Trio in terms of technical criteria[4]. Such statements were representative of the unfortunate trend of the growing disunity among the Associated Trio states.

Ukraine-Georgia relations and the full-scale Russian invasion

Prime Minister Gharibashvili’s statement was not an isolated incident but rather reflective of a broader trend in the deteriorating relations between Ukraine and Georgia. The relations have already soured in recent years. However, after Russia launched its full-scale invasion, the discord between the two states became overtly noticeable. Traditionally strong value-based ties were undermined, since the current Georgian government, led by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, adopted an ambiguous stance towards Russia. While displays of solidarity with Ukraine are limited to “wishing peace” and voting in favour of pro-Ukrainian resolutions on international platforms, the Georgian government has conveyed mixed messages about the Russian aggression[5] and enhanced economic cooperation with Russia[6]. This rhetoric contradicts the traditionally strong ties and the principles outlined in the strategic partnership agreement between the two states[7].

The deterioration of Ukraine-Georgia relations has coincided with the growth of anti-Western sentiments in the GD’s narratives. The GD has frequently levelled accusations against Ukraine and the West, alleging their attempts to destabilise Georgia. Leaders of the ruling party, such as Prime Minister Gharibashvili and the GD’s chairman Irakli Kobakhidze, have on numerous occasions parroted the Russian propaganda narrative of the existence of a “global party of war”[8], consisting of Ukraine, the West, and the Georgian opposition, which is supposedly trying to instigate a so-called “second front”[9] against Russia and thereby drag Georgia into war. At the same time, the Ukrainian government have responded with strong criticism of the Georgian government’s stance[10].

The culmination of the Georgian government’s detrimental statements towards Ukraine occurred on 30 May, during Prime Minister Gharibashvili's participation in a thematic discussion at the Global Security Forum (GLOBSEC) in Bratislava. When asked by the moderator about his thoughts on why Russia initiated the full-scale war with Ukraine in 2022, Gharibashvili replied: “I think everybody knows the reason. One of the main reasons was NATO, NATO enlargement.[11]” This statement vividly illustrates the growing divide between Ukraine and Georgia in the perceptions of the current international political landscape.

At the same time, Moldova has pursued a markedly different path compared to Georgia in response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, under the leadership of President Maia Sandu[12]. Moldova’s geographical location, shielded by Ukraine and sharing a direct border with the EU, has certainly played a role in shaping its trajectory. However, considering the presence of Russian troops in Moldovan territory, the unpreparedness of its military, and Russia’s significant influence over certain segments of Moldova's population[13], potential Russian interference and destabilisation is not a hypothetical scenario. In light of these challenges, Moldova’s pro-European government has decisively strengthened the country’s European orientation, strongly supported Ukraine, taken a resolute stance against Russia, and weaned itself off from dependency on Russian energy[14]. The issue of sanctions against Russia is another example of the changing dynamics of Moldova’s foreign policy. At the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, both Moldova and Georgia refused to join sanctions against Russia, citing concerns over security and potential economic damage. However, in the spring of 2023, Moldova has begun to gradually align itself with the EU-imposed sanctions against Russia[15].

The European Political Community Summit: highlighting the divide

The second European Political Community (EPC) summit was held on 1 June in Bulboaca, Moldova. The selection of this location holds symbolic significance, as it is situated a mere eight kilometres from the temporarily occupied Moldovan territory of Stînga Nistrului, commonly referred to as ‘Transnistria’. For Moldova, hosting such a significant event is an achievement, which firmly places the country in European politics.

The summit focused on security, energy resilience, and interconnectivity in Europe[16]. Within this framework, support for Ukraine and Moldova was the central topic on the summit’s agenda, while Georgia found itself receiving limited attention during the event. Ukraine and Moldova acted as a de-facto tandem, pleading to accelerate their European integration, and using bilateral exchanges with EU leaders to emphasise this message. Encouragingly, both countries received positive signals about their European aspirations. Prior to the summit, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that Moldova is the “heart of Europe” and that the EU supports the country “every step of the way”[17]. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis also underscored the significance of the summit, highlighting that it served as “an opportune moment to show that Moldova is not alone and that the European Union supports Moldovan citizens in fulfilling their European aspirations”[18]. Moreover, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell declared that the presence of European leaders in Chişinău was a sign of European solidarity with Ukraine[19].

The growing EU support for Moldova can be evidenced in several developments. Currently, the Moldovan army is undergoing a process of rearmament and modernisation, with significant funding allocated by the EU[20], coupled with an unprecedented increase in Moldova’s defence budget[21]. Crucially, from 25 May to 2 June, Moldova held joint exercises with five NATO countries, named “Air Bastion 2023”, with one of the main objectives being to provide security measures during the EPC summit[22]. Moldova is also actively countering Russian political influence, with the EU support being crucial in this regard. Moldova’s determination is exemplified by the appointment of Dorin Recean, the then Minister of Interior, as Prime Minister and subsequent criminal charges against the leadership of the Russia-backed Șor party, suspected of illegal financing[23]. In its turn, on 28 April 2023, the EU adopted a special sanctions framework to target individuals responsible for destabilising Moldova[24]. On 30 May 2023, seven individuals were listed, among them the leadership of the Șor party[25]. Additionally, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian mission to Moldova, established on 24 April 2023 to assist the country in addressing Russian hybrid threats, was formally launched during the summit.

Given the EPC summit’s focus on security, its symbolic location, and the support from the EU, it can be inferred that the issue of the de-occupation of Transnistria was another crucial topic of discussion, although unofficially. Currently, the territory is de facto governed by the unrecognised Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and is militarily controlled by Russia, which maintains its troops in the area. The presence of this unresolved conflict poses political questions regarding Moldova's prospects for rapid European integration. However, several factors offer potential opportunities for Moldova to address the Transnistria issue in the short term. Ukraine’s political and military resistance against Russia, along with the overall weakening of Russia’s influence, plays a significant role in this regard. Notably, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi, in his remarks to the press during the summit, stated that if Moldova’s government makes an official request, Ukraine will respond and help[26], implying readiness to assist Moldova in resolving the issue of Russian military presence in Transnistria. Additionally, strong support from the EU can bolster Moldova’s efforts to find a resolution.

However, during the second EPC summit, Georgia did not receive positive signals about its European integration akin to the statements about Ukraine and Moldova. Georgia missed the opportunity to highlight its significant role for the Black Sea region and wider European security, as well as address the issue of the de-occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, temporarily occupied by Russia. The summit demonstrated that the EU’s security efforts in the Caucasus are currently directed at solving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. This was evidenced in the meeting of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev with European Council President Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on the sidelines of the summit.

The omission of Georgia’s issues from the EPC summit’s agenda can likely be attributed to the ambiguous stance of the current Georgian government towards the EU, Ukraine, and the West, rather than the position of EU leaders. As previously mentioned, the GD government has grown increasingly anti-Western in its rhetoric. The ruling party is steadily showcasing its growing illiberal and authoritarian tendencies by choosing Hungary as a role model[27] and attempting to limit civil liberties with the infamous “foreign agents” bill. Furthermore, Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s foreign policy is decreasing, which is exemplified by the continuous refusal to align with EU sanctions against Russia, Belarus, and even Myanmar[28]. At the same time, Georgian economic ties with Russia are growing, with the decision to resume direct flights to Russia after nearly four years of suspension being a vivid example of this. Such actions of the GD government may constitute a conscious effort of sabotaging Georgia’s European integration, which is desired by over 80% of Georgia’s population[29].

The absence of a personal meeting between Georgian Prime Minister Gharibashvili and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi at the EPC summit symbolically reflects the current state of affairs within the Associated Trio. This situation, although not surprising in light of recent developments in Georgia-Ukraine relations, is still noteworthy considering their historically strategic and value-based nature. Moreover, President Zelenskyi, critical of recent developments in the partner country, mentioned Georgia as an example of Russia’s attempts to draw countries “into lawlessness” of “creeping Russian occupation”, comparing it to Belarus[30]. Thus, he highlighted the importance of providing security guarantees to Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, while pointing out the current divergence within the Associated Trio. Adding to the symbolism, the positioning of Presidents Zelenskyi and Sandu at the centre of the family photo of the summit, while Prime Minister Gharibashvili stood at a distance from his Associated Trio partners, reinforces the visible divide within the group.

 

Conclusion

The EPC summit in Moldova served as yet another confirmation of Georgia falling behind in its European integration. On the one hand, Georgian Prime Minister Gharibashvili’s claim about Georgia being the most advanced country within the Associated Trio in terms of reforms and technical criteria holds factual accuracy. However, the government's opaque political activities and ever-growing antagonism towards the West and Ukraine have hindered genuine progress. Despite Georgia's previously favourable position as a leading member of the Associated Trio, the country's current backtracking in European integration becomes all the more perplexing.

Georgia missed a valuable opportunity to effectively communicate its aspirations on a wider European level. While Georgia’s concerns regarding the lack of a security umbrella are justified from a geopolitical standpoint, the government’s attitude of antagonising its European partners certainly hampers progress in this regard. Despite Russia’s historical weakening, the Georgian government has not fully embraced the chance to enhance cooperation with NATO member states in the field of security and advocate for security guarantees. Moreover, insufficient efforts have been made to ensure unwavering support from Western partners in the de-occupation of Georgia’s temporarily occupied territories. The future of Georgia’s progress also lies in the EU’s ability to reward the Georgian people’s long-standing commitment to European integration, while encouraging positive political change within the country.

The Associated Trio is currently a de-facto defunct initiative. The format falls short of fulfilling its intended purpose of fostering closer cooperation among the three states regardless of their varying European integration progress, geopolitical positions, and internal political situations. The European integration efforts of the three states are lacking coordination and common positions on communication with EU institutions and Member States are not being developed. Distance between Ukraine and Moldova on the one hand, and Georgia on the other hand, continues to grow. Regrettably, the opportunity to utilise the EPC summit to clarify official positions and release strong joint statements was not seized.

Indeed, the Associated Trio format holds potential benefits for its participants. By fostering regional cooperation in economic and political matters, the format can contribute to the growth of their economies, increase their geopolitical weight, and strengthen societal ties. Additionally, successful integration within this framework can serve as a demonstration of the three states’ preparedness to join the European Union. Consequently, close cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova, which are currently enjoying massive support from the EU, is essential for Georgia to progress in its EU accession process. Restoring political unity within the Associated Trio would enable Ukraine and Moldova to advocate for Georgia's inclusion in the common track of European integration. Thus, it is necessary to ensure that Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are on the same wavelength regarding their European aspirations.

To achieve this, Georgia needs to demonstrate its willingness to revitalise cooperation within the Associated Trio. In this regard, it is crucial for Georgia to show unwavering solidarity with Ukraine, re-establish the strategic partnership between the states, and demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to common values. The remarkable progress achieved by Moldova on its European integration path, despite previously trailing behind, serves as an inspiring example that Georgia can draw upon. Simultaneously, Georgia’s government must deliver on the twelve conditions put forward by the EU. Neglecting this responsibility would not only infringe upon the will of the Georgian people to become part of the European family but also exacerbate the distance between the Associated Trio countries. Georgia’s ability to ensure necessary reforms and positively engage with its partners will give the Associated Trio the potential to become a story of success.

 

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